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Abstract
Statistical income surveys are used to document systemic changes in distribution and
redistribution of household income and its determinants over the period 1988-1996. First, the
growing difficulties facing income surveys under the democratic regime are considered.
Secondly, the substantive meaning of various income indicators and their relation to the social
and economic situation is discussed. Next, growing disparities in income after 1989 and the
shift away from demographic factors (numbers of active earners and children, age) to socio-
economic factors (education, branch, occupation) are displayed. The fourth part documents
the increased redistribution of income achieved through taxes and social benefits. The fifth
part compares the Czech case with Western countries in order to evaluate the extent to which
income distribution has adjusted to the market economy. The conclusion offers a summary of
main findings and discusses some additional resources of family welfare during the transition
period.
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Non-technical Summary
Using three large statistical surveys of household income, we observe changes in the range
and structure of income, and examine whether the Czech Republic is approaching a market
model. Our ambition is to survey not only changes in disparities, but also to study qualitative
changes in the income distribution system. We reflect on the methodological difficulties of
income surveys. Then we investigate to what degree income indicators reflect the character of
the political regime and economic system. Further, we analyze the main changes in income
distribution and their causes. Then we concentrate on the redistribution of income through
taxes and social benefits, and lastly we show the extent to which Czech income has adjusted
to the market by employing comparative data from Western countries.
Between 1988 and 1996, the range of income inequality increased considerably. The
income hierarchy remained fixed at the bottom, and opened up, reducing income share of
middle categories. Whereas in 1988, pensioners almost exclusively occupied the bottom
decile, to a considerable extent they moved to the lower middle income ladders to be partly
replaced by families with children. Household income is much less determined by
demographic variables today than in the former regime. From the other side, the importance of
labor market characteristics of adult family members increased. In the structure of income per
capita, education tripled in importance. Data indicate that the income position of non-manual
and educated workers improved while the number of manual and less skilled people
worsened.
With regard to income redistribution, the state takes more from and gives less to
households. Number of children is no longer the prominent factor of both taxes and transfers
as it was in the communist regime. Instead, household income has become the dominant
determinant of taxes, and also a more important determinant of social transfer. At the same
time, flows of redistribution strengthened, be it in connection with tax reform (more
progression) or social reform (more targeting). The equalizing intervention of the state in
favor of the poor and near-poor (and to the detriment of the middle classes) appears to be very
high in comparison with even the most redistributive Western countries.
The changing income structure represents part of the general trend that is reintroducing the
Czech Republic to the family of ‘standard’ market countries. In income per household,
disparities are still higher in the Czech Republic than in West European countries. In contrast,
the disparity of per capita income reached the level of ‘socially generous’ Western countries
(Belgium and Sweden). In determination of household income, the weight of demographic
factors weakens and dependency of household income on labor market participation and the
human capital of adult members strengthens. Regarding the level and degree of redistribution
through taxes and social transfers, the Czech Republic much more redistributive in taxes and
considerably more redistributive in social benefits that any other OECD country under
observation.
The available variables do not allow us to compare the labor market and human capital
characteristics of households across countries and thus to document more precisely the current
situation in the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, even with the indicators at our disposal, it can
be concluded that the distribution of household income in the Czech Republic is much less
different from Western countries regarding inequality and its structure in 1996 than in 1988.
Only the equalizing effect of taxes and social benefits continues to be rather extreme: a huge
amount of transfers (as in social-democratic countries) is combined with a steep slope of
redistribution (as in liberal countries).4
1. Introduction
In the second half of the twentieth century, the Czech nation, located in the troubled heart of
Europe, experienced two radical changes of regimes. The first was in 1948, when the
communists seized power and went on to implement their doctrine in its most repressive form
until the mid-1950s. Forty years later, economic reform, involving large-scale privatization
and liberalization, heralded a ‘return to the market’. The first change of regime – the
‘communist revolution’ – outwardly proclaimed an ideology of equality. However, it followed
the Soviet model of how to feed more workers on less. As a consequence, wages were
equalized, and need and loyalty became the main criterion of reward. The second regime
change – the ‘capitalist counter-revolution’ – aimed at de-equalizing earnings, re-introducing
market competition and re-creating income from business.
The empirical observations of these two political upheavals in income distribution stand in
stark contrast to each other. There are no reliable income surveys from the period before or
immediately after 1948. Thus, the picture can only be composed from a mosaic of various
data, such as pension fund registers of wages, branch statistics of wages, and non-
representative Family Expenditure Surveys. By the time the first solid wage and household
income surveys were launched in 1956, an entirely new system of distribution was already in
place. In contrast to missing data from the first regime change, there are adequate and reliable
data sources for the second change. Three household surveys conducted by the Czech
Statistical Office (CSO) are already available covering the period 1988-1996.
Immediately after 1989, the Czech Republic metamorphosed from one of the most hard-
line communist countries into a democratic country with a largely privatized economy. Its
GDP in constant prices decreased considerably in 1991, not reaching its 1989 level again until
1996. The average wage increased at a higher rate than productivity of labor, but social
benefits rose by a significantly smaller amount. Until 1996, the Czech Republic was at the
forefront of the transition countries in terms of basic macroeconomic indicators and the speed
of (formal) privatization. Wage and household income inequality rose. Education, formerly
suppressed, became an important factor in individual careers and earnings. In 1996, social
transfers and taxes became more transparent and redistribution more progressive. In a sense,
this year marks the accomplishment of important changes which were not, however,
successfully continued through the rest of the decade.
In this paper we focus on the second of the two changes of political regime. The available
statistical data give us a unique opportunity to investigate changes introduced by the restored
market system. Our ambition to survey not only changes in disparities, but also to study
qualitative changes in the income distribution system. In the next part, we reflect on the
methodological difficulties of income surveys. The third part investigates to what degree
income indicators reflect the character of the political regime and economic system. In the
fourth part, we analyze the main changes in income distribution and their causes. The fifth
part concentrates on the redistribution of income through taxes and social benefits, while the
sixth part shows the extent to which Czech income has adjusted to the market by employing
comparative data from Western countries. In conclusion, the main findings are summarized
and some additional resources of family welfare are discussed.5
2. Increased difficulty in ascertaining income
The methodology used to conduct income surveys changed with the political regime. Under
the totalitarian regime, the refusal rate for participation in surveys was low, because even if a
survey was not expressly designated as compulsory, people were afraid to refuse to comply
with any official inquiry. The most important sources of income were directly transferred by
the state administration – the wages of individual workers were passed on by their employer
organizations and pension benefits were reported by the post offices that distributed them. The
communist government commissioned large surveys as a means of demonstrating the regime’s
achievements in ‘increasing the standard of living of working people’. Consequently, income
surveys were highly – at least with regard to the formal economy.
After four decades of basically one income source, ‘capitalist’ profits became legitimate
income alongside ‘working class’ wages and social benefits. Since 1990, the share of earnings
from state-dependent activities has decreased, while the share of income from self-
employment and entrepreneurship has been slowly rising. Instead of uniformity, we are now
presented with a wider variety of economic status and also their mixture like combination of
dependent full-time employment with independent part-time employment.
1
Table 1
The growing obstacles to income inspection can be documented in the three income
surveys cited here (Table 1). From various reasons, the previous method of directly
transferring income information from state organizations had to be abolished after 1989. The
coverage of surveyed income in comparison with calculations of National Accounts has
decreased substantially, this despite corrections made by statisticians after the collection of
data. Such problems are, however, quite common to income surveys.
2 Yet despite these
shortcomings, income surveys carried out by the CSO constitute the best, if not the only,
representative source of information on household incomes in this country (the Family
Expenditures Survey is not appropriate for this study because it is not based on a random
sample in the Czech Republic).
3. Income indicators as social constructions
To reflect upon the matter, income distribution is a ‘social construct’, rather than a given fact,
as is the case with poverty (Rainwater, 1994). The results depend largely on the income
concept chosen, the selection of which is not entirely free of value judgement and political
considerations. Basically, we can chose to take as our indicator from among income per
household, income per capita, or something ‘in between’, which means household income
calculated per equivalent unit. The large diversity of equivalence scales was exhibited in the
LIS comparative analysis (Buhman et al., 1988; Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995).
                                                          
1 According to the Labor Force Survey, 4 per cent of entrepreneurs and 7.7 per cent of self-employed persons
were at the end of 1996. Combining LFS with the number of licenses issued, we estimate the number of people in
full-time employment with a business license as constituting up to 15 per cent of the labor force. Most of their
extra income is not registered in income surveys. In Microcensus 1996, only 0.3 per cent of economically active
persons declared amounts of income from secondary self-employment.
2 The figures on coverage released by the Czech Statistical Office differ from our calculation and cite 87, 86 and
93 per cent in consecutive years. According to the LIS study (Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995:34), the
ratio of survey estimates to National Accounts estimates ranged from 77 per cent (Germany in 1981) to 92 per
cent (Canada in 1981).6
According to this analysis, the continuum of possibilities is expressed by the elasticity
coefficient in the formula:
W = D / S
e
where W = economic well-being, D = total disposable income, S = size of household and
exponent e = elasticity coefficient. The elasticity coefficient varies between 0 (full-scale
economies) and 1 (no scale economies). In ‘communist’ statistics, income per capita was the
only indicators used. This means that each person was given the same weighting, without
regard to age, and no economies of scale were assumed. By contrast, in ‘Western’ statistics
total disposable household income served as the most frequent indicator for a long time. This
difference was already apparent in the first East/West comparison of income (Incomes, 1967)
as well as in another comparison by Wiles (1978), and was most recently commented by
Flemming and Micklewright (1999).
In the past, it was quite common to begin any East-West comparison of incomes with the
statement that communist societies displayed an extreme equalization of income (e.g. Wiles,
1974; Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992). Such a position is certainly well founded if we use
income adjusted per capita. However, once we begin to look at the indicator of income per
household or any equivalent unit acknowledging larger scale economies, the range of
inequality appears to be higher. More specifically, while the pre-1989 figures on inequality of
per capita income in Czechoslovakia are among the lowest in the world, figures on inequality
of income per household are close to, if not higher, than those in Western countries (Vecernik,
1986).
Why did distribution in the former Czechoslovakia (and probably also in other communist
countries) differ so greatly from Western countries in income per capita and so little in terms
of income per household? In Western countries, employment of women was low and
disparities in earnings of the main breadwinner were thus the main source of inequality in
household incomes. In Eastern European countries, and especially in the former
Czechoslovakia (where wages were extremely equalized and employment of women was the
highest), inequality in household income was predominantly determined by the number of
family members active in the labor market and the economic status of the head of household.
Concretely speaking, one-pensioner households occupied the bottom of the income
distribution, while rural families with several active earners dominated the top.
The most obvious reason for using the indicator of income per household in Western
literature is because it can be taken from the best available source for examining income
inequality – tax statistics. Since the 1980s, income distribution has usually been analyzed
using income surveys and authors refer to income adjusted to household size and
composition.
3 In communist countries, income surveys were the sole source. We can also
speculate as to whether presenting only income per capita statistics was an effort to hide actual
income disparities in the country. In any case, this income indicator is well suited to the ‘need
principle’, according to which economic life was organized under communism, as opposed to
the ‘market principle’ implicitly or explicitly prevailing in capitalist regimes (Vecernik 1996
and 1999).
The ‘need principle’ refers to a primary focus on the basic needs of the reproduction of
individuals, who are largely viewed as ‘soldiers of labor’. This principle was explicitly
                                                          
3 However, as the LIS study documents, countries such as France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
still use non-adjusted household income (Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding 1995:54).7
formulated by Marx ([1867]1965) as a prominent mechanism for the reward (and
exploitation) of hired labor by capitalists. The owners of the means of production do not pay
for the worker’s labor itself, but for the reproduction of his labor force. While capitalism itself
refused to follow this logic (resulting in the forecasted impoverishment of the working class),
communist regimes achieved it through reducing disparities and deriving wages from the
different manual force invested. In contrast, the ‘market principle’ can be viewed as an
assertion of the relationship between a person’s job, including invested skills and the quality
of work done.
The use of income per capita under the communist regime was indeed endorsed by a
particular structure of consumption. Here, the cost of individually ‘divisible items’ such as
food and clothing was higher, while the common costs of households such as housing and
furnishing was lower than in Western societies.
4 Moreover, the family budget was frozen, due
to state manipulation of consumer prices: the consumption of food was encouraged through
price subsidies and the consumption of durable goods was prohibited through shortages and
high taxes on prices. Housing in state apartments was cheap (and correspondingly bad) and
thus did not place much of a burden on the family budget, accounting for about 6-7 per cent of
net expenditures.
In our view, the various use and the different explanatory power of individual income
indicators is not an artifact. Income measures should correspond to the way household income
is actually collected and utilized, which differs across regimes and countries. After efforts to
eliminate the family as an institution failed, communist societies aimed at least to reduce its
power through employment, wage and price policies that always stressed individuals and their
needs. However, in the same way that infinite scale economies are not possible (as the
indicator of total household income implies), neither were zero scale economies possible (as
the indicator of per capita household income suggests).
This also means that while disparities of total household income certainly overestimated
the inequality of welfare in the West (unless the total household income was used), disparities
of per capita income underestimated inequality in the East (where the indicator of per capita
income was widespread). As Buhman et al. (1988) suggest, the reality is always somewhere
‘in between’ and individual countries in various periods of their life can be located on the
large continuum of coefficient e, according to the price and consumption structure. Instead of
the difficult inspection of the ‘best’ equivalence scale, most research utilizes one calculation
based largely on a rule of thumb, be it the EU, OECD or LIS equivalence scale.
5
Schema 1
We acknowledge its usefulness for comparison across countries and time and do not intend
to criticize all simplifications of such an equalizing method because any country and time
specific approach is fraught with difficulties. Our aim here is to show extensive changes
introduced by the transition in the determination of earnings, the packaging of family income
and the price structure. We argue that there are not only quantitative changes in range of
disparity and its correlates, but that behind such shifts, the qualitative character of the whole
system of income distribution is modified: the system corresponding to command economy is
                                                          
4 Flemming and Micklewright (1999:25) also consider income per capita to be ‘more appropriate for socialist
societies on account of the lower fixed costs of households due to subsidized prices of housing and fuel’.
5 In the OECD scale, first adult = 1.0, other adults = 0.7 and each child = 0.5. In the LIS scale, first adult = 1.00,
other adults = 0.66 and each child = 0.33. In the square root approach, square root of the number of household
members so that 2-person household equals 1.41 of equivalent adult, 3-person household 1.73, etc.8
replaced by another, typical of the market economy. Schema 1 stylizes the different patterns of
income distributions typical for different regimes.
In this study, we observe disposable household income which equals the gross market
income plus state transfers, after accounting for personal taxes and social insurance
contributions. We use two ‘extreme’ indicators of income: the first is total disposable
household income (per household) and the second household income adjusted per household
members (per capita). In the second case, households are weighted by the number of
household members, in line with the LIS method (Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995).
The reason for employing both measurements is to inspect their individual shifts and the
changing relation between both income indicator measurements. We suspect that, combined
with the other evidence, they testify important changes in the Czech income structure.
4. Market adjustment in range and structure
Leaving aside any exaggerated optimism, in the period 1990-1996 the Czech Republic
undertook several important steps towards a market economy (Vecernik, 1996). In the income
sphere in particular, economic reform allowed for an increase in the formerly frozen
differences in earnings through new private business, foreign firms and less strict (and soon
released) wage regulation. In social security, the privileges of the ruling class were abolished
and valorization rules (previously non-existent) were introduced. It also allowed for other
sources such as income from property and financial speculation, and led to the expansion of
income from the informal economy.
Table 2
Inequality of disposable household income has been rising in the period 1988-1996 (Table
2). This rise is slower for per household income and faster for per capita income. Whereas the
correlation between income per household and the number of active earners as well as
between per capita income and dependent children is weakening, the correlation between the
two income indicators is strengthening. This indicates that disparities in family earnings are
growing sufficiently wide to prevail over the number of active family members.
6 The high
correlation of various adjustments in household income shows that there is little sense in
employing other equivalence scales in parallel to examine income inequality.
7
Disparity between shifts in distribution of income per household and per capita is
explained by the changing composition of households. While the average size of households
in the period 1988-1996 remained unchanged (2.66 members) and the number of dependent
children fell slightly (from 0.76 to 0.69), the number of economically active members
decreased considerably (from 1.48 to 1.24). Two different causes have contributed to this: the
pressure on working pensioners to leave the labor force (compelled by heavy taxation of their
earnings) and the pressure on women to stay at home or support their husbands in their
business.
8
                                                          
6 According to Microcensus surveys, the Gini coefficient of wages of all economically active workers rose from
0.19 in 1988 to 0.24 in 1996.
7 The first scale is the steepest (in Buhman’s et al. formula e =0.74), the second moderate (e=0.64) and the third
the flattest (e=0.50).
8 Between 1988 and 1996, the share of households in prime age (25-54 of the head) with a single active earner
increased from 29.7 to 36.7 per cent, while the average of economically active members in those households
decreased from 1.86 to 1.82.9
Table 3
Table 3 shows income distribution by deciles. According to income per household, the
share of bottom decile increased slightly while the share of top decile rose considerably.
According to income per capita, the top decile also increased its share, but the rest changed
unevenly in the two periods. Between 1988 and 1992, the relative position of the lower half
was largely maintained while the upper half (but not the very top) declined somewhat. This
was the ‘pre-privatization period’ of the social-liberal government which maintained universal
social benefits and kept wages under control. Between 1992 and 1996, relative stability or
even an increase was registered in the upper half while the lower half lost out. This was the
‘privatization period’ of the self-declared liberal government, which replaced universal with
targeted benefits, removed wage regulation, froze the minimum wage, and allowed for a rapid
rise in earnings not supported by a growth in the productivity of labor.
In both periods, the middle of the income distribution was squeezed. In terms of real
disposable income per household, the lowest and highest income categories increased their
living standards, while middle incomes lost 10-20 per cent of their purchasing power.
However, the rising share of the bottom decile is somewhat spurious because there was
considerable demographic mobility within it, as shown below. In terms of income per capita,
only the top decile gained, while the bottom decile lost the most. The results given by the two
income indicators are disproportionate, thereby indicating the uneven change in various
categories of the population and the modification of the income hierarchy in socio-
demographic terms. In spite of this, the middle class has not enjoyed significant gains from the
transition (Vecernik, 1999).
Table 4
Table 4 shows the distribution of pensioners and children size in individual deciles. The
most apparent change was that pensioners were replaced by children in the lower part of the
income distribution. While in 1988, the share of first decile of total disposable income was
composed exclusively of pensioners, who also accounted for two-thirds of the second decile,
by 1996 to both of these deciles had been entered children. In other words, the lowest income
had ceased to be represented exclusively by transfer incomes (pensioners = non-working poor
= ‘old’ poverty) and had become newly represented by low market incomes (families with
children = working poor = ‘new’ poverty).
Instead of other cross-sections (by education, type of occupation and size of locality), we
use a multivariate analysis. The main purpose is to compare two sets of income predictors: 1.
demographic or life-cycle variables (age, the size and composition of households) and 2.
economic or labor market variables (education and occupation). The methodological difficulty
arises from the fact that, although the ‘demography’ of a family is relatively easily indicated
and represented in all income surveys, the specification of ‘labor market capacities’ is not
easily obtained and is not comparable across all surveys.
9
Table 5
In the analysis of variance (Table 5), only households with the head in prime age (25-54)
are included. This allows us to display the changing proportions of ‘demographic’ and
‘economic’ factors in households participating in the labor market. We observe a weakening
                                                          
9 In the 1988 Microcensus, only variables consisting of broad social categories (working class, other employees
and cooperative peasants) are available. In 1992, the distinction employee/self-employed was added. The 1996
Microcensus was the first to incorporate branch of activity and occupation in a more detailed classification.10
of the life-cycle profile of household income in favor of its labor market profile. In terms of
income per household, the specific importance of the age of the household head is close to
zero in 1996 and the weight of the number of children almost disappeared. According to per
capita income, the specific weight of the number of children almost halved. In univariate
analysis based on the same data sources, the number of children itself explained 46 per cent of
the variance of income per capita in households in prime age in 1988. By 1996, this had fallen
as low as 27 per cent.
From the other side, the importance of labor market characteristics of individuals (in our
analyses only household heads) increased. The manual/non-manual distinction, not perceptible
in the communist period, re-appeared in both income indicators. In the structure of income per
capita, education tripled in importance. All of these changes indicate that there was
considerable income mobility, more specifically, that the position of non-manual and educated
workers has improved while the number of manual and less skilled people worsened. There
were certainly other important changes according to branch and sector of ownership, but
unfortunately the available data do not allow a comparison over time.
5. Towards a more transparent redistribution
In contrast to obscure redistribution under the communist regime, income distribution was
made more transparent after 1989. Price subsidies were abolished in mid-1990. By 1993, the
wage tax (almost flat at the time) was replaced by a new progressive income tax and a new
formula of employee and employer pension and health contributions was introduced. By 1996,
the system of social benefits had been simplified and targeting introduced. In 1991, the
official ‘living minimum’ was established. Since 1993 its level has served as a bench-mark for
income testing of various social benefits within the state support scheme (especially family
allowances).
10 Overall, the distribution of market income has been visibly separated from its
state redistribution through taxes, contributions and benefits.
The general level of redistribution in a country is typically displayed as the proportion of
taxes and contributions in GDP (the so-called tax quota). The new system started on a rather
high level of redistribution, nevertheless both tax and contribution rates decreased slowly but
regularly until 1998. Currently, the Czech tax quota is located somewhere between the liberal
Anglo-Saxon and social Scandinavian countries, close to Germany, and Austria (which
redistribute somewhat less), the Netherlands and France (which redistribute somewhat more).
According to the OECD, the composite (taxes plus contributions) tax quota in 1996 was 40.3
in the Czech Republic, 35.9 in the United Kingdom, 38.2 in Germany, 44.1 in Austria, 43.9 in
the Netherlands, 45.7 in France and 51.9 in Sweden (OECD, 1997).
Unlike the macroeconomic calculation, it is not possible to examine distributional flows in
their entirety the variety on a microlevel due to a variety of subjects (households and firms)
and channels (through incomes and consumption). Our observation is limited to direct taxes
paid by households (the wage tax in 1988 and income tax together with contributions for
                                                          
10 The subsistence income scheme calculates greater amounts for individual persons and lesser lump-sum
amounts for families according to their size. The mode of calculation stresses personal needs and disregards
common household expenditures, thus continuing to follow the communist ‘needs’ principle. The elasticity
coefficient of the subsistence income with the size of household is 0.85, in comparison with an average elasticity
of 0.7 in Western countries, as reported by Buhman et al.1988.11
health and social insurance in 1996) and the state benefits they receive.
11 Moreover, for the
sake of comparability over time, it is necessary to limit the analysis to the non-agricultural
employee population. This is because co-operative farmers were not taxed under the
communist regime and there were virtually no self-employed in 1988.
Table 6
The calculation of taxes and benefits according to income deciles on the comparative sub-
sample reveal important changes over time (Table 6). While the amount of income tax and
social contributions increased, social benefits decreased in this section of the population, by a
similar level of around 5 percentage points. If we take the population as a whole, the rise in
the financial burden of households is less striking, but still apparent (see Table 10 below). The
diminishing ‘social wage’ provided in kind by state enterprises and/or trade unions (crèches
and nursery schools, recreation, canteens, etc.) makes the transformation of the system even
less advantageous for families with children.
Together with the growing financial burden, both taxes and social benefits are distributed
more steeply among households, in accordance with the reform design. During the communist
regime, wage tax (the rates of which were established in the late 1950s) completely lost its
progressiveness, until the overwhelming majority of workers had advanced to its highest level
(17 per cent). The progressiveness of the new system is evident despite the fact that the
majority of the active population is still hit by the first band of income tax (15 per cent) and
only very few by the second (20 per cent). Regarding social benefits, their targeting was the
main purpose behind the new system of state social support introduced in 1996.
Table 7
Table 7 presents a regression analysis of taxes, social benefits and their summary
redistributive effect. The relationship of taxation to both the number of active earners and
especially children per household weakened, and the effect of household income on the tax
level increased from a almost zero in 1988 to becoming a factor of prime importance among
employees and of considerable importance among all households. The determination of social
benefits took a similar course, but to a lesser extent. The shift documents the systemic change
– generally speaking, Czech society has been moving from redistribution based on family
lifecycle redistribution based on family income. Unlike the communist system of income
distribution, which was shaped according to the basic needs of individuals, the new system
stresses the economic capacity of the household.
6. Moving closer to the West
The changing income structure represents part of the general trend that is reintroducing the
Czech Republic to the fold of ‘standard’ market countries. This is to be displayed using the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), we selected countries representing the ‘liberal’ (USA, UK),
‘social-market’ (Austria, Germany), ‘welfare’ (Belgium, the Netherlands) and ‘socialist’
(Sweden) veins. Although most of the LIS data sets are less recent than the latest for the
Czech Republic, it is still possible to compare national data on the legitimate assumption that
                                                          
11 The wage tax under the communist regime, which remained in place until the end of 1992, also included social
security payments and state support of families with children. It differed by gender, age, marital status and the
number of dependent children. It is thus legitimate to compare the wage tax with income tax plus contributions
for health and social insurance.12
income distribution and structure changes much less rapidly in stabilized Western systems
than in transitional countries, as Michael Förster’s (2000) study witnesses.
Table 8
As Table 8 shows, changes occurring after 1989 certainly brought the Czech Republic
closer to the West. In income per household, disparities are still higher in the Czech Republic
than in West European countries. In contrast, the disparity of per capita income reached the
level of ‘socially generous’ Western countries (Belgium and Sweden). We have to remember
that it was especially households located above the lower bound value of the tenth income
decile (P90) that profited from the transition: whereas the relative per capita income level of
households at this limit in the Czech Republic in 1996 is around the level of Sweden or
Belgium, the relative position of households at the lower bound value of the top income
vintile (P95) is closer to the higher Dutch or German levels.
The second cross-national comparison concerns the determination of household income.
As correlations of income per household with income per capita in the last column of Table 8
illustrate, the distance between the two income distributions characteristic for the communist
regime seems already to have disappeared. Their increasing interrelationship indirectly
indicates a weakening of demographic factors and social transfers in income packaging and,
correspondingly, a strengthening dependency of income on labor market participation and the
human capital of adult members. Statistically speaking, this means that actual family welfare
is less sensitive on income indicator and that the mode of adjustment of income to family
needs has less importance than before.
Table 9
To gain a more detailed look at the generation of inequalities, we compare the importance
of basic demographic determinants in the collection of household income. Table 9 shows that
in cross-national comparison, the percentage of variance explained by these variables was so
high in pre-1989 Czech Republic that only Sweden could compete with it. Now this
percentage has decreased to a level much closer to Western countries and puts the Czech
Republic somewhere between ‘social-market’ (such as Germany) and ‘liberal’ (such as the
UK) countries. This concerns both the income per household (and the weight of the number of
active earners in its formation) and income per capita (and corresponding weight of the
number of dependent children).
Table 10
The third comparison concerning the level and degree of redistribution through taxes and
social transfers presents the Czech Republic as a rather unique case (Table 10). It is much
more redistributive in taxes and considerably more redistributive in social benefits that any
other OECD country under observation. Here, we should be aware of the fact that the steep
distribution of taxes is largely due to the continuing non-taxation of pension benefits and that
pensioners continue to occupy the bottom of distribution in a considerable degree. Due to this,
the Czech Republic belongs to the liberal model in both tax and transfer distribution. The
reform of the system which started to be introduced in 1993 has even strengthened
redistributional flows.
12 The targeting of benefits did not affect the very bottom of the income
distribution (mostly pensioners), but the second quintile (poor families with children).
                                                          
12 As Gardiner (1997) documents, the redistributive effect of tax and transfer policy has also recently increased in
most Western countries.13
The available indicators do not allow us to compare the labor market and human capital
characteristics of households across countries and thus to document more precisely the current
situation in the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, even with the indicators at our disposal, it can
be concluded that the distribution of household income in the Czech Republic is much less
different from Western countries regarding inequality and its structure in 1996 than in 1988.
Only the equalizing effect of taxes and social benefits continues to be rather extreme: a huge
amount of transfers (as in social-democratic countries) is combined with a steep slope of
redistribution (as in liberal countries).
7. Conclusion and discussion
Using three large statistical surveys of household income, we detected changes in the range
and structure of income, and examined whether the Czech Republic has escaped from the
model of income distribution centered on the basic reproduction of individuals and is
approaching a market model. Between 1988 and 1996, the range of income inequality
increased considerably. The income hierarchy remained fixed at the bottom, and opened up,
reducing income share of middle categories. Whereas in 1988, pensioners almost exclusively
occupied the bottom decile, to a considerable extent they moved to the lower middle income
ladders to be partly replaced by families with children. Household income is much less
determined by demographic variables today than in the former regime.
With regard to direct income redistribution, the state takes more from and gives less to
households. Number of children is no longer the prominent factor of both taxes and transfers
as it was in the communist regime. Instead, household income has become the dominant
determinant of taxes, and also a more important determinant of social transfer. At the same
time, flows of redistribution strengthened, be it in connection with tax reform (more
progression) or social reform (more targeting). The equalizing intervention of the state in
favor of the poor and near-poor (and to the detriment of the middle classes) appears to be very
high in comparison with even the most redistributive Western countries.
In our analysis of nominal household income, we omitted several factors which contribute
to family welfare and its distribution: the informal economy, relative prices, and the quality of
consumer goods and services. In all these areas, important changes have also occurred. As it is
very difficult to measure them, we will only briefly comment on them.
Firstly, the size of the informal economy certainly increased, alongside the reduced ability
and will of the state to control keeping of market rules. Observing the gap between income
and consumption (including the huge increase in expenditures on cars, houses and recreation),
economists consider that the official national income figures in the first half of 1990s
underestimate it by about 20 per cent (Benacek, 1994; Vecernik, 1996, chapter 8). Obviously,
new sources of income are very unevenly distributed among the population. Whereas
employee households living exclusively from wages and those dependent on social transfers
are disadvantaged, the self-employed and businessmen are favored. The double status of being
employed full-time and at the same time self-employed part-time is also widespread. The
extremely high incomes of the privatization insiders are completely obscured by official
income figures.
Secondly, relative prices have changed considerably. This was initially due to the abolition
of price subsidies on ‘basic goods’ and the price burden of ‘luxury goods’, and later due to the
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play of market forces, including the operation of market chains and Vietnamese bazaars
pushing prices down. As the prices of foodstuffs and the prices of other (industrial) goods
rose differently, the gap between them disappeared and a variety of goods and prices
began to provide a much larger consumer choice. At the same time, the costs of housing
increased considerably, however not on the market level, due to continuing state
regulation. Thus, the previously varied costs of housing for rented, co-operative and
family-owned apartments converged. At the same time, however, black housing market
appeared, due to rent regulation.
Thirdly, the quality of consumer goods and services improved considerably. Open
borders and market competition enhanced both the supply and quality of most goods. In
place of the formerly uniform and mostly inferior supply, customers may now choose
from a huge range of domestic and imported goods of much higher quality, especially in
the area of electronics, automobiles, textiles and furniture. They can also use previously
unavailable possibilities for travel. The Consumer Price Index fails to reflect such a
tremendous change in quality and choice. Moreover, health and life expectancy have
improved due to better supply of pharma products and the radical change in diet,
facilitated by a decrease in the consumption of meat (encouraged before by subsidized
prices and a lack of alternatives) and an increase in the consumption of fruits and
vegetables (limited before by scarce supply and variety).
It is not easy to assess or, even, accurately measure the effect of these various changes
on family welfare. Without a doubt, the real level of household welfare is higher than
income surveys suggest. If informal income were included, disparities in family welfare
income would be likely to increase. Regardless, all households could benefit some way
from easier accessibility to a wider selection of better quality goods and services.
Our story ends by 1996 income data which, fortunately, already reflect major tax and
social reforms. In mid-1997, the recession hit, doubling the unemployment rate and
slowing the rise of wages and pension benefits. But the qualitative change of the system
of income distribution was not hindered by it, as small sociological surveys document.
Only to confirm these trends on large sample we will have to wait until mid-2004 when
the next Microcensus envisaged to be conducted in March 2003 will be available.15
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Schema 1 Income distribution under command and market economy
Characteristic Command economy Market economy
Generator of inequality mainly the state mainly the labor market
Distribution according to basic needs skills, performance
Main factors of inequality
in earnings
gender, age, hard manual
labor, loyalty to the regime
human capital, managerial
position, risk-taking
Main factors of inequality
in household income
number of active earners
and dependent children






contrast to low shared
costs (housing)
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individualized items in
contrast to high shared
costs




(or adjusted to steep
equivalent units)
per household income
(or adjusted to flat
equivalent units)
Correlation of income per





future, current or past
worker
family, household as a
economic and social unit17
Table 1 Characteristics of Czech income surveys
Characteristic 1988 1992 1996
Targeted per cent of households 2 0.5 1
Survey sample (N of households) 69,912 15,677 27,314
Non-response rate in percentage of households 4.2 15.7 23.8
Household income per capita according to income
surveys
*)
- in nominal terms (thousands CZK yearly) 22.3 33.7 63.5
- growth in real terms (1988=100) 100.0 78.1 93.4
Population income per capita according to
aggregate statistics
**)
- in nominal terms (thousands CZK yearly) 25.9 42.0 83.5
- growth in real terms (1988=100) 100.0 84.2 103.7
Coverage of income surveys in comparison to
aggregate statistics
86.1 80.2 76.0
Sources: Microcensus 1988, 1992 and 1996, Statistical Yearbooks, Czech National Bank.
*) Income per capita in surveys is weighted by persons.
**) According to the Balance of Incomes and Expenditures of the Population in 1988 and 1992 and National
Accounts in 1996.18
Table 2 Characteristics of distribution of household income
Indicator Per household Per capita
1988 1992 1996 1988 1992 1996
Coefficients and decile ratio:
Variation 0.53 0.69 0.73 0.40 0.56 0.65
Gini coefficient 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.20 0.23 0.26
Decile ratio (D90/D10) 5.12 4.95 5.21 2.43 2.51 2.91
Correlations with household size and composition (Pearson coefficients):
Number of all members 0.59 0.55 0.52 -0.64 -0.51 -0.15
Number of active earners 0.73 0.59 0.61 0.04 0.10 0.18
Number of children 0.29 0.28 0.28 -0.75 -0.59 -0.21
Correlations with other income indicators (Pearson coefficients):
Per capita 0.45 0.65 0.67 - - -
OECD equivalent unit 0.70 0.82 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97
LIS equivalent unit 0.77 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.94 0.94
Square root 0.88 0.94 0.82 0.82 0.91 0.91
Sources: Microcensus 1988, 1992 and 1996.
All coefficients are significant on the level <0.001.19
Table 3 Distribution of household income and the real growth by income deciles (per cent )
Income
decile
 Per household (PH) Per capita (PC) Real growth in 1988-1996
  1988 1992 1996 1988 1992 1996 PH PC
1 2.5 2.9 2.8 5.3 4.9 4.3 105.6 74.6
2 4.1 4.1 3.9 6.6 6.4 5.9 88.5 82.8
3 5.9 5.8 5.6 7.4 7.3 6.8 88.7 85.9
4 7.6 6.9 6.7 8.1 7.9 7.6 81.7 87.7
5 9.3 8.1 7.9 8.8 8.6 8.3 79.7 88.5
6   10.7 9.6 9.4 9.6 9.2 9.1 81.4 88.6
7   12.0 11.1 10.9 10.6 10.1 10.1 84.5 89.2
8   13.2 12.8 12.7 11.8 11.3 11.5 88.9 90.8
9   15.1 15.2 15.4 13.6 13.2 13.7 95.0 93.7
10   19.6 23.5 24.7 18.2 21.1 22.6 117.3 116.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 93.4 93.4
Sources: Microcensus 1988, 1992 and 1996.20
Table 4 Distribution of children and pensioners by income deciles











1988 1996 1988 1996 1988 1996 1988 1996
1 0.1 1.0 16.0 13.5 14.1 19.3 11.1 2.5
2 1.1 2.8 14.9 12.0 14.2 16.5  9.9 4.9
3 2.7 4.2 16.9 19.6 13.8 13.0  9.6  9.9
4 6.7 6.3 13.0 17.3 13.2 9.3  9.6 16.7
5 10.4 11.7  9.5  9.1 12.6 8.1 8.6 18.3
6 13.3 14.5  7.1  7.3 11.3 7.7  9.0 16.2
7 16.2 15.3 5.3  6.2   9.4 7.6 8.6 12.1
8 17.4 15.6 4.9  5.6  6.7 6.9 9.6 8.1
9 17.0 14.9 5.3 5.3  3.6 6.0 10.8 6.4
10 15.0 13.6  7.0 4.3 1.2 5.5 13.1 5.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Microcensus 1988, 1992 and 1996.21
Table 5 Analysis of variance of (ln) household income (per cent of total variance)
Factor No of ca- Per household Per capita
tegories 1988 1996 1996 1988 1996 1996
Main effects 62.82 43.73 48.88 59.26 48.22 53.75
N of active earners 3 24.21 27.86 27.34 3.84 3.92 3.85
N of children 5 5.42 2.40 2.84 31.84 19.43 22.79
Age of the head 7 1.89 0.23 0.16 3.03 0.22 0.29
Non-manual 2 0.16 0.70 0.53 0.00 1.43 0.76
Education 4 3.29 3.45 4.88 1.19 3.59 4.79
Locality 3 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.07 0.64 0.64
Branch - - 1.58 - - 1.35
2-ways interactions 3.16 2.36 * 2.60 1.75 *
Explained 65.98 46.08 48.88 61.86 49.97 48.88
Sources: Microcensus 1988 and 1996.
Only households with head in prime age (25-54).
All coefficients are significant on the level <0.001.
* Due to empty cells or a singular matrix, higher order interactions are not available.22
Table 6 Relative taxes and social benefits by income deciles (per cent)
Income According to income per household According to income per capita
decile Taxes Social benefits Taxes Social benefits
1988 1996 1988 1996 1988 1996 1988 1996
1 16.1 16.6 17.0 17.9 10.3 11.9 30.1 30.5
2 14.1 16.0 23.4 22.0 11.9 14.8 24.0 22.0
3 13.6 16.3 24.2 21.8 13.0 16.4 20.4 17.6
4 14.4 17.2 21.2 18.3 13.7 17.4 18.0 15.5
5 14.9 18.0 18.5 15.4 14.1 18.3 16.6 14.1
6 15.2 18.2 16.6 13.6 14.8 18.8 15.3 13.8
7 15.3 19.7 15.6 11.2 15.4 19.8 14.4 11.7
8 15.7 20.2 14.7  9.9 16.0 20.4 14.2 10.1
9 16.0 21.4 13.8 7.8 17.2 21.6 14.1 7.8
10 16.1 24.1 12.4 4.8 17.4 24.6 15.4 4.4
Total 15.3 20.0 16.7 11.9 15.3 20.0 16.7 11.9
Sources: Microcensus 1988 and 1996.
Only households of non-agricultural employees.
Relative tax is computed as the percentage of income tax and social contributions in gross household income.
Relative social benefits are computed as the percentage of social benefits in net household income.23





Social benefits Summary effect
gories 1988 1996 1988 1996 1988 1996
Employee households*)
N of active earners 3 0.19 0.06 -0.31 -0.32 -0.28 -0.25
N of children 5 -0.53 -0.31 0.38 0.18 0.47 0.23
Age of the head 7 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02
Household income metric 0.01 0.43 0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.22
R
2  0.33  0.29  0.24  0.18  0.30  0.21
All households
N of active earners 3 0.63 0.52 -0.62 -0.61 -0.64 -0.60
N of children 5 -0.31 -0.16 0.15 0.05 0.20 0.08
Age of the head 10 -0.37 -0.32 0.46 0.39 0.45 0.38
Household income metric -0.01 0.23 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.11
R
2  0.57  0.67  0.78  0.79  0.77  0.79
Sources: Microcensus 1988 and 1996.
*) Only households of non-agricultural employees with head in prime age (25-54).
Relative tax and social benefits are calculated the same way as in Table 6. Summary effect is computed as
benefits - taxes in percentages of net household income.
All coefficients are significant on the level <0.001.24
Table 8 Distribution of household income in OECD countries
Country Year Per cent of median income P90/P10 Correlation
PH/PC*
P10 P25 P75 P90 P95
Per household:
Belgium 1988 47.9 70.3 133.7 172.2 200.8 3.59 0.56
France 1984 45.9 68.8 139.4 193.7 238.6 4.22 0.61
Germany 1984 45.8 68.8 134.1 178.6 213.8 3.90 0.62
Netherlands 1987 50.8 72.9 134.4 181.7 216.9 3.58 0.60
Sweden 1987 39.0 61.8 136.7 164.5 183.7 4.22 0.48
UK 1986 41.2 62.9 146.7 204.7 240.2 4.97 0.65
USA 1986 31.8 58.0 149.2 210.1 252.1 6.61 0.64
Czech 1988 31.8 58.6 132.6 162.7 182.9 5.12 0.45
Republic 1996 38.7 65.6 147.4 201.6 246.2 5.21 0.67
Per capita:
Belgium 1988 56.9 73.8 134.2 174.1 201.6 3.06 0.61
France 1984 47.5 68.2 144.9 206.1 253.9 4.33 0.64
Germany 1984 54.3 73.3 141.9 193.2 230.9 3.56 0.70
Netherlands 1987 55.8 72.5 140.6 192.8 228.3 3.50 0.68
Sweden 1987 58.2 77.1 136.6 171.7 194.2 2.95 0.45
UK 1986 45.6 68.5 144.7 203.9 247.9 4.47 0.68
USA 1986 33.2 60.7 157.3 232.0 288.4 6.99 0.70
Czech 1988 66.8 81.1 128.7 162.5 185.5 2.43 0.37
Republic 1996 60.9 78.6 131.2 177.1 220.3 2.91 0.68
Sources: Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995 (Table 4.10), LIS database, Microcensus 1988 and 1996.
*) Pearson correlation coefficients between per household (PH) and per capita (PC) income. In the lower part
weighted by persons.25












1988       1996
Per household:
Main effects 36.04 16.57 52.04 24.33 25.98 59.33 33.37
N of active earners 22.95 11.31 25.59 22.33 18.16 37.11 28.56
N of children 2.52 0.67 1.48 0.30* 0.22  7.79 2.85
Age of the head 3.96 2.47 1.59 0.61 2.24  1.62  0.34
2-way interactions 4.88 ** ** 2.65 1.23 2.58 1.94
Explained 40.93 16.57 52.04 26.97 27.20 61.91 35.31
Per capita:
Main effects 38.37 33.77 50.06 36.80 31.62 57.39 33.38
N of active earners 3.17 1.43 2.72 4.91 3.52 4.70 4.09
N of children 30.12 25.69 40.29 24.98 24.87 32.72 18.72
Age of the head 1.28 0.63 1.24 1.01 1.68 3.20  0.52
2-way interactions 4.19 ** ** 4.38 1.86 1.54 1.91
Explained 42.56 33.77 50.06 41.18 33.48 58.93 35.29
Sources: LIS database; Microcensus 1988 and 1996.
Only households of non- agricultural employees with head in prime age (25-54).
All coefficients (except those marked *) are significant on the level <0.01.
** Due to empty cells or a singular matrix, higher order interactions are not available.26














1988       1996
Taxes:
1 5.5 10.3 6.3 4.5 3.8 1.7 1.8
2 10.4 10.0 12.5 8.1 6.9 11.1 5.4
3 17.0 16.2 17.7 15.9 13.9 20.2 14.1
4 23.4 22.3 23.3 25.0 22.6 27.3 25.1
5 43.7 41.2 40.1 46.4 52.7 39.7 53.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average 24.4 36.4 32.5 21.4 21.2 14.8 20.2
Transfers:
1 21.8 24.9 15.2 26.7 29.2 27.5 27.5
2 22.2 21.3 25.8 25.9 21.2 23.4 30.6
3 16.7 16.9 21.7 19.4 17.1 17.1 20.4
4 21.0 17.7 19.9 16.1 17.5 15.8 12.7
5 18.3 19.2 17.4 11.9 15.1 16.2  8.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average 24.1 43.4 42.7 30.1 14.5 26.2 24.9
Sources: LIS database; Microcensus 1988 and 1996.
Household income is adjusted to an equivalent unit which is computed as root square of the size of household.THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
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